




While ties between Cambodian diasporas and Cambodia
have been significant and enduring over the decades of
conflict, the political changes engendered by the interna-
tionally endorsed elections of 1993 have transformed the
scope and characteristics of the transnational traffic.
Shaped by complex ideological, class, gender, and genera-
tional dynamics, Cambodian diasporas’ re-engagement
with the ancestral homeland has since acquired a multi-
dimensionality that extends beyond mere monetary remit-
tance. Spanning both private and public spheres, from
national to household levels, these transnational encoun-
ters necessarily dislodge the narrow analytic focus and as-
sumptions that accompany much of the discourse of
transnationalism, and interrogate critical issues of nation-
alism, citizenship, and belonging.
Résumé
Malgré l’importance et la solidité des liens entre la dias-
pora cambodgienne et le Cambodge au cours de décen-
nies de conflit, les changements politiques engendrés par
les élections avalisées de 1993 ont modifié la portée et les
particularités de la circulation transnationale. Le réenga-
gement de la diaspora à l’égard de la patrie, influencé
par une dynamique complexe quant aux idéologies, aux
classes, aux sexes et aux générations, a depuis acquis une
dimension multiforme qui dépasse la simple allocation
monétaire. Ces rencontres transnationales, englobant les
sphères privées et publiques, du foyer à la nation, écar-
tent les hypothèses et les points de vue analytiques fermés
qui accompagnent souvent le discours sur le transnatio-
nalisme. Elles remettent également en question les no-




espite the challenges posed by protracted conflict,
compounding dislocations, and distance, Cambo-
dians dispersed throughout various refugee camps,
in third-country settlement, and in Cambodia have main-
tained  strong ties that extend not only across time and
geography but also across multiple dimensions of economic,
social, and political engagement. From the late 1970s to the
early 1990s, when contact was constrained by political im-
pediments, difficult access to the border camps and the
economic hardships that confront new refugees in their
countries of resettlement, these translocal relationships were
sustained essentially through letters and financial remit-
tances. In some instances, these exchanges were conducted
between the many nodes in diaspora; in others, they made
their way by circuitous routes from asylum in the West to
needy families languishing in liminal refugee camps. Until
the repatriation of refugees from the Thai-Cambodia border
in 1991, remittances from overseas Cambodian communi-
ties provided a critical economic buffer, especially for fami-
lies in camps not recognized by the UN. They continued,
through the late 1980s and early 1990s, albeit in an imper-
ceptible trickle, largely through the community of interna-
tional non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that
emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
termination of Soviet subsidies. Following the repatriation
of refugees from the Thai border camps back to Cambodia
in 1991, support from overseas Cambodian communities
was especially important for returnee families with little or
no access to land and other productive means.
While transnational relations have been enduring and
significant during the two decades of virtual regime isola-
tion in Cambodia, the political changes brought about by
the internationally endorsed elections of 1993 transformed
the scope and nuance of transnational traffic. Liberalization
of state control over movement of people, capital, goods,
and information both into and out of Cambodia fortified
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and diversified transnational connections. Shaped by dif-
fering political tendencies and by complex class, gender,
and generational dynamics, Cambodian diasporas’ re-en-
gagement of the ancestral homeland has since acquired a
multi-dimensionality that, heretofore, has not been possi-
ble. Many overseas Cambodians embarked on the political
routes initially through transnational activism during the
conflict period and subsequently through participation in
the post-war coalition government. Many more solidify
their transnational ties through family remittances and
sponsorship of development projects and cultural activities
in  Cambodia. Some  opt  for long-distance involvement,
others for actual return. The greater number go back and
forth in the attempt to reconcile the fissures of dislocated
lives, families, and communities.
The lived experiences of Cambodian diasporas, as they
reflect historical, temporal, and spatial multiplexity,1 chal-
lenge the bounded concept of the community and the linear
approach towards migration. Rather than the presumed
directional finality in the exit from one context and assimi-
lation into another, Cambodian transnational experiences
underscore the circularity of movement and the multidi-
mensionality of connections. They dislodge the analytic
centrality placed on monetary remittances that pervades
transnational studies, and bring into focus the diverse
forms, nuances, and textures of transnational connections
that are equally compelling. They also interrogate the un-
critical idealism that accompanies much of the discourse of
transnationalism. The process of reconnecting and return
for Cambodian diasporas, as it is for many transnationals,
has not been without tremendous challenges. Their irrefu-
table agency notwithstanding, diasporas are constrained in
their ability to effectively intervene and participate in
homeland developments by the larger political, social, and
economic contexts in which they have to operate both in
their originary place and in their new places of resettlement.
In the nexus of local, national, and global exigencies, agency
and subjectivity exist in constant dialectical juxtaposition.
Homeland and Exilic Longing
In  a context where  rupture and entanglement, loss  and
remembrance, coexist in accustomed tension, the notion of
time and space must be spoken of in terms of memory and
imagination, in what Edward Said referred to as that “end-
less  temporal  notion  in which  past, present, and future
intertwine without any fixed centers.”2 Being a refugee, as
Hans Wicker points out, “means being engaged in a kind of
lifelong psychological balancing act.”3 For forcibly displaced
individuals, the “discontinuous state of being”4 reflects the
inability to free themselves from the past. Thus, as Homi
Bhabha points out, rather than speaking of locality in “some
utopian sense of liberation or return”, “the place to speak
from was through those incommensurable contradictions
within which people survive, are politically active and
change.”5 In fundamental aspects, it is in the context of this
liminality that attachment to the “homeland” becomes most
registered. The poignancy of longing is rooted fundamen-
tally in the denied possibility of return for in the reconstruc-
tion of myth and memory; it is, as Said puts it,
“fragmentation (that) makes it even more real.”6
Cambodian diasporic longing for the homeland, as such,
must be understood in light of the historical trauma of war,
revolution, exile, and rupture. In essence, the nature and
extent of the disconnection accounts for the reconnection
that is sought. For many Cambodians, the rupture created
by the losses and sufferings under the Khmer Rouge, and
in the case of refugee survivors by physical dislocation from
the homeland, was compounded by the nature of the atroci-
ties. Disappearances and mass graves are especially signifi-
cant in a Buddhist country because they deprive surviving
relatives of the ability to perform the necessary rituals to
ensure the successful transmigration of the soul, hence of
the essential closure to these tragic life experiences. In many
instances, this engenders a psychical sense of “being stuck”
not only for the soul of the departed but for the survivors
as well. Moreover, the virtual autarky that shrouded the
country from 1975 to 1979 kept fractured families impris-
oned in the liminality of not knowing. For many refugees,
this “unresolved business” is made even more acute by the
circumstances of flight—abrupt, often secretive and always
perilous, resulting in further separation and deaths. These
experiences combined account for the inability of the sur-
vivors to move forth towards building a new life and a new
history. Memories of the past and of all that had been left
behind essentially deny them the luxury of focusing on
what they do have  in the present and what they could
envision for the future. Above and beyond the politics, the
economics, and all the other “loftier” motivations, return
for many Cambodian diasporas is compelled by that sim-
ple, yet insistent, need just “to light an incense” in remem-
brance.
The collective guilt of survivor-refugees is exacerbated
by the conditions of post-war Cambodia. The decimation
of the educated class and the enormity of Cambodia’s needs
exert additional pressure on the surviving and newly
emerging professional and middle classes overseas. As re-
flected by Dr. Pen Dareth, who traded his lucrative position
in Holland for a return home, “the country has helped me
a  lot  by sending  me  abroad on a scholarship,  now it’s
payback time. My conscience would not allow me to remain
in Europe because I must help rebuild my country.”7
Among the 1.5 generation8 of Cambodian-Americans, in
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particular, one of the frequently proffered reasons for want-
ing to engage in the process of national reconstruction is
simply that “we had the opportunity (for education, for
jobs . . . ) which people in Cambodia did not have . . .
Without Cambodia, I wouldn’t be who I am; I need to put
something back.”9
For diasporic communities, however, the longing for the
homeland is rooted not only in the context of displacement
but also in the experience of exile, reflecting diasporas’ own
positions and relationships with the receiving society. Eth-
nicity, as Sorenson points out, is “a product of interaction,
not isolation.”10 In this sense, the post-resettlement experi-
ence of the refugees and their relationship with the host
society incubate that longing for return. For many Cambo-
dian refugees, resettlement in the US has not been without
considerable challenge. With a disconcertingly high rate of
welfare dependency and statistics of over 41 per cent of the
population living below poverty line,11 Cambodian-Ameri-
cans are part of that “implosion of the Third World into the
First.”12 Among first-generation refugees, relatively few
professionals were able to re-enter that sector of employ-
ment after their resettlement in the US. Many gravitated
towards social services, partly because it was an area where
they could apply their bilingual skills and administrative
training. Though civil service may afford them stability and
social status, many remain frustrated with the downward
mobility and the un-/under-fulfillment of their life aspira-
tions. For many refugees, encounters with racism in Amer-
ica further underscore the denial of belonging.
The prevailing sense of marginalization and insecurity in
diaspora amplifies the siren call of the homeland. The need
to confront and navigate around multiple hegemonic con-
texts points to transnational social fields as being “in part
shaped by the migrants’ perceptions that they must keep
their options open.”13 Being “obliged to live within a tran-
snational space and to make a living by combining quite
different forms of class experience,” migrants have to “con-
tinuously translate the economic and social position gained
in one political setting into political, social and economic
capital in another,”14 and in so doing, they “become skilled
exponents of a cultural bifocality that defies reduction to a
singular order."15 In this sense, dual citizenship, as with
many features of transnationality, should be looked upon
not simply and simplistically in terms of splintered loyalty
but as a strategy for maximizing social and economic capital
in the effort to enhance the personal and collective sense of
security. In Cambodia’s stringently stratified society, where
family names, educational achievement, former status, and
even age continue to be reservoirs of traditional legitimacy,
returning elites, even those who are economically dispos-
sessed, can find personal affirmation and a raison d’être that
anonymity of life in the US has robbed them of. If nothing
else, the  association with  America commands a  certain
social and political premium. Framing the discussion of
involvement and repatriation as such highlights the ele-
ments of expediency and instrumentality that are often
overshadowed by the discursive preoccupation with the
nobler motivation for return.
Diasporas and Transnational Political
Remittance
Addressing the need to emphasize both the subjectivity and
agency embedded in the refugee experience, Richmond ad-
vocated looking at refugees not “as helpless victims of forces
beyond their control but ‘survivors’ who create something
out of their crisis.”16 Despite forcible displacement and dis-
persed resettlement, refugee families and communities had
mobilized to provide economic and political support for the
homeland. Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia was a rally-
ing cry for Cambodian  diasporas. Coalescing  under the
umbrella of the government-in-exile (CGDK), exiled intel-
lectual, political, and military elites came together, bound by
little more than their shared desire for regime change in
Cambodia, to form the initial core of oppositional leader-
ship. At the grassroots, in places such as Long Beach, Lowell,
and Chicago, it was a common sight to see Cambodian
refugees, most with little education and little previous po-
litical awareness, gathering in community halls or at the
local temples after long hours at their factory shifts for
meetings with party representatives in search of political and
financial support. Meager earnings from low-wage labour
made their way into party coffers. Local noodle houses were
always abuzz with political debates and exchanges of home-
land news  drawn from community newspapers  that are
dedicated largely to political developments in Cambodia,
with only a peppering of local news. Rural Cambodians,
awakened from their pre-political state by the mass victimi-
zation of Khmer Rouge draconian policies, have come to
recognize the direct relevance of politics to their welfare.
Constituting the majority of the refugee population, these
peasant-nationalists provided critical support for the dias-
poran political cause. The resistance movement, coordi-
nated and supported largely from outside Cambodia, was
one of the principal catalysts compelling  the  negotiated
settlements that officially marked the end of the Third Indo-
china War.
Following the internationally brokered peace settlement,
Cambodian-Americans advocated for and won the right to
run for office and vote in the elections. As a result of political
pressure from Cambodian-Americans and their interna-
tional supporters, voting stations were set up at the UN
headquarter in New York while eight political parties led by
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Cambodian-Americans participated in the 1994 elections.
Over the last decade, returning Cambodian-Americans have
held prominent positions in government and non-govern-
ment sectors while many in diaspora continue to serve as
critical links in the transnational networks committed to
bringing about systemic change, some through advocacy and
others, like the Cambodian Freedom Fighters, through more
militant means.
Community Organizations and Transnational
Activism
Where traditional leadership is dislocated and dispersed and
the community fractionalized along multiple dimensions,
organizations provide both the structure and the ideology
for regroupment and involvement. In fundamental ways,
community-based associations provide the space for affirm-
ing and expressing cultural and ethnic identity as well as the
structure for channeling this expression into actions.17 For
politically displaced diasporas for whom politics constitute
a diacritical marker of their communal identity, the social
and political domains are inseparable. As it was with the
Korean and Sikh communities in America, community-
based institutions provide Cambodian-Americans a forum
not only for the affirmation of religious and cultural identi-
ties but also for political activism. They serve as the institu-
tional facilitators for local mobilization, providing venues
for receiving representatives of the government-in-exile,
channeling strategic access to a dispersed community, and
acting as structural links among overseas Cambodian com-
munities and between diasporas and the home country.
Given the bifocality of diasporic consciousness, partici-
pation in community programs thus enables diasporas to
“live out the tension embedded in the ‘experiences of sepa-
ration and entanglement’, of living here and remember-
ing/desiring another place.” 18
The self-perception of Cambodian diasporas as critical
interlocutors of the country’s political fate facilitates the
merging of domestic and homeland agendas. Many com-
munity events reflect social and political concerns centred
both in the US and in Cambodia, providing the leadership
in diaspora with the means and opportunities to conduct
homeland political work, in tandem with the fulfillment of
their social service mandate. It is not unusual, therefore, to
find event programs listing panels on Cambodian-Ameri-
can youth and educational issues alongside presentations
on international border negotiations and democracy build-
ing in Cambodia. In the 1990s, the umbrella organization
for Cambodian-American mutual assistance agencies, the
Cambodian Network Council, would  typically set aside
each of the two days of the national convention for domes-
tic and homeland issues respectively. In its present incarna-
tion, the organization has added a “border committee,” one
charged with addressing Cambodia’s frontier disputes, to
its standing committee structure.
Organization, as Samuel Huntington argues, “is the road
to political power,” and that power can be leveraged both
in diaspora and upon return to the ancestral homeland. In
providing a forum for the articulation and reaffirmation of
culture and ethnic identity, these organizations perpetuate
a context where traditional norms regarding social status,
leadership, authority, and relations of obligation are vali-
dated and reinforced. In  this process, they provide the
institutional base for the cultivation of patron-client net-
works and other forms of social capital that can be extended
into the political arena in Cambodia, where personal loyalty
remains a principal asset. Those with established power
bases overseas can thus convert these political assets into
access and influence in Cambodia. It is significant that, of
the Cambodian-Americans who returned to hold impor-
tant positions in Cambodia in both government and non-
governmental  arenas, many emerged from the cadre of
social service providers and from the leadership of commu-
nity-based organizations in the US.
Formal Economic Ties
While homeland politics is a central preoccupation of Cam-
bodian diasporas, it is also true that active (as opposed to
supportive), high-level participation in the political process,
be it in Cambodia or in diaspora, and long-term repatriation
have been the privilege of the few. Even with the determina-
tion and desire to re-engage, many overseas Cambodians are
unable to undertake long-term relocation because of eco-
nomic constraints such as home mortgages, college tuition,
and other family obligations. Moreover, access to positions
and real money-making opportunities require not only eco-
nomic but political capital, which many refugees do not
have. These constraints, in effect, may reinforce transna-
tional mobility as they necessitate constant movement back
and forth.
For most Cambodian families, transnational ties are
forged and maintained largely through non-political ven-
ues. For overseas Cambodians with business acumen and
means, economic liberalization and the magnitude of the
country’s post-war needs make it possible to capitalize
upon the comparative advantages that they possess – cul-
tural and language competency, family and professional
connections, as well as expertise and connections garnered
in the West – to assume important roles as investors, entre-
preneurs, and critical intermediaries for firms seeking to do
business in Cambodia. Cambodian-American owned com-
panies, travel agencies with multinational branch offices,
hotels and motels, restaurants, fast-food eateries, and even
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a private college have mushroomed since the political open-
ing in 1993. While the incipient nature of the legal and
business infrastructure and lack of systemic transparency
in Cambodia continue to deter many potential investors,
they also provide an environment in which more opaque
business undertakings do thrive. Though relatively little
capacity building and technology transfer have taken place,
these intermediations have yielded benefits for Cambodia.
As a Delcom representative points out, access brokered
through the Cambodian-American connection brings in
critical resources to the country: “Delcom has brought in a
lot of money and expertise by building the first power plant.
We ensure  there is transfer of skills and  technology to
Cambodia. We have also created jobs for hundreds of local
workers.”19
In spite of opportunities and interest, there are factors
that limit entrepreneurial activities. The destruction of stra-
tegic human resources under the Khmer Rouge further
eroded the weak entrepreneurial base left in place by Cam-
bodia’s colonial experience, accounting for the limitation
of social and economic capital within the diasporic com-
munity. As a result, most of the business enterprises, such
as doughnut franchises, are linked to the small community
of Sino-Cambodians who historically constitute the com-
mercial backbone of Cambodia’s economy. Following the
political opening of Cambodia, these are the individuals




Though Cambodia has since made a transition from reha-
bilitation to slow development and the enthusiasm of the
international business community has sobered over the
years,  overseas  Cambodians continue  to  play  significant
roles in the country’s economic development, particularly
through non-formal avenues. As people travel back and
forth, goods are brought in and sold in both market arenas,
at the very least as a way of deferring the cost of travel.
Traditional handicrafts, gems, textiles, and ethnic foods,
items much desired in diaspora, now stock the shelves of
ethnic grocery stores in America’s inner cities while medi-
cines, second-hand goods, and luxury items of the West find
their way through the labyrinth of family-based economies
in Cambodia. The dynamics observed in the Dominican
immigrant community are mirrored in the Cambodian
transnational experience: “to the untrained eye, these trav-
elers may appear as common migrants visiting and bearing
gifts for their relatives back home, when they are actually
engaged in trade.”20 In a refugee community of high Eng-
lish-language illiteracy, particularly among the older popu-
lation, “trip facilitators” find a lucrative niche as travel es-
corts and facilitators of home visits. This was particularly
true in the earlier years when travel to Cambodia was much
more complicated than it is presently. In a country with
weak banking infrastructure, carriers with service charges
ranging from 10 to 25 per cent, depending upon the acces-
sibility of the destination, continue to provide the principal
means of capital remittance. In a country of high illiteracy
and little trust, video technology provides instant confirma-
tion of the transaction. Not uncommonly, individuals are
simultaneously engaged in multiple ”informal" activities.
Travel, for instance, may be financed through “service fees,”
while expenses can be deferred, and profit made, through
the sale of goods brought into and out of both Cambodia
and the US.
Transnational Cultural Projects
In light of the dislocations that surviving refugees experi-
ence, the struggle to “make whole again” begins with the
attempt to thread some continuity into life in exile. Com-
munity events are thus replete with cultural activities that
not only affirm their cultural identity as Cambodians in
America but also bridge the present with the interrupted
past. Religious ceremonies are aimed not only at the well-
being of the refugee communities in America but also des-
tined  for  those  left behind in Cambodia. Conducted in
makeshift temples or in rented high school auditoriums,
ceremonies such as Pchum Ben, the day of the ancestors, are
marked as much by the sense of continuity as they are by the
absence. Faded pictures and names scribbled on torn pages
from school notebooks lie on the offering tables. For many
refugees, young and old, these rites are no longer simply
performative but are imbued with the rawness of irreparable
loss. The genocidal experience intrudes in what, in the past,
has been a largely ritualistic, cultural moment:
It always reminds me of my older sister who died from starva-
tion in the Khmer Rouge regime . . . It is believed that Pchum
Ben is the time when the souls of the dead are set free from hell
and the living relatives must start to make offerings in food and
gifts of religious value to their dead ancestors or the spirits . . .
I always think that my sister soul always comes and rests with
my family during the days of the festival. And, I still maintain
the same feeling that she is still very hungry. And I want to give
her rice to eat. . . .21
With increased travel and communication between the
homeland and diaspora, religious and cultural activities
have acquired a transnational feature. Whereas previously
activities such as the Pchum Ben are largely confined to the
community in the US or in Cambodia, surviving families
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now remit money to Cambodia for the conduct of religious
ceremonies and for exhumations and reburials from
Khmer Rouge mass graves. As “community” comes to be
defined transnationally, communal mobilization around
religious activities such as the Krathen festival, dedicated to
temple fundraising and other merit-making projects, nec-
essarily extends across nation-state boundaries and geopo-
litical divides. Collectively, Khmer Buddhist communities,
from Long Beach to Lowell to Philadelphia, have actively
raised funds for religious projects in Cambodia, whereas
previously these activities were confined to local commu-
nities in the US. The ability to organize and participate in
the Krathen in Cambodia allows Cambodian-American
elderly to reconcile, in however small measures, with the
fact that they will have to live their final years in exile.
Beyond the religious arena, the desire for re/connection
that  had spurred sister-cities campaigns aiming  to pair
Phnom-Penh with Long Beach, California, and Si-
hanoukville with Seattle, Washington, also saw local ex-
pressions. Hometown associations and alumni groups have
contributed to the construction and renovation of schools
and clinics in their native communities. Under the leader-
ship of Mr. Thavy Nhem, for instance, the Beng Trabek
High School Alumni Association raised $50,000 for the
rehabilitation of their alma mater.22 Similarly, alumni of the
pioneer Lycee Sisowath with their historical involvement in
political activism in France now extend their mobilization
to other diasporan communities and to non-political mul-
tinational projects.
As bridges that link and transcend temporal, geographi-
cal,  and political distance, transnational activities allow
diasporas to reconnect with homeland village communities
and to  feel a renewed sense of empowerment as  active
contributors to national reconstruction. Through these
contributions and renewed ties, individuals and families
also reap social status and insure their place in an estab-
lished community. One Cambodian-American profes-
sional who funded the construction of a clinic in his family’s
natal province puts it as follows: “my family is from that
area. It is a way of keeping the family name in that place.”23
The same spirit reverberates in Mexican-American tran-
snational communalism, “. . . the Absent Ones, Always
Present.”24 After two decades of war and destruction, these
construction projects stand as the “aesthetics of disloca-
tion,”25 edifying the creative and regenerative impulses of a
fractured and wounded community. Against the backdrop
of political instability and endemic uncertainty, these struc-
tures, be they religious or secular, are venues for ascertain-
ing a certain permanency of presence, of belonging,
memorialized in defiance of temporality.
There is, additionally, an immeasurable sense of empow-
erment that comes with this transnational sponsorship. For
a people weighed down by the loss of self-determination,
the ability to undertake positive actions, to see that one’s
simple actions are bettering numerous lives, can be over-
whelmingly gratifying. Given relative deprivation, even the
economically marginalized in the US can become benefac-
tors back in Cambodia. As one proud sponsor of a well-dig-
ging project in Takeo province pointed out, “At night I go
to bed and think about people drinking my water, cooking
food with it and bathing from the clean water of my well.
Where else can one get that level of satisfaction for a mere
$200!”26 Transposed onto an alternate arena, dispossessed
and marginalized refugees in America can and do become
power wielders; they are not simply impoverished and
subjugated minorities but individuals with knowledge and
resources to impart, irrespective of socio-economic stand-
ing, gender, and age. In a country where 90 per cent of the
population  are Buddhists,  and where the Buddhist wat
stands at the social and cultural centre of every Khmer
village community, temple renovation and construction
are fundamental aspects of national reconstruction. For
elderly refugees with limited education and economic
means, participation in these transnational cultural activi-
ties thus enables them to assume a position of leadership,
both in the diasporan community and in their natal com-
munity in Cambodia, and to be meaningfully engaged in
the process of change, thereby validating their continued
importance and relevance.
Along with the spiritual and psychical rationale for en-
gagement, there is also a utilitarian imperative for the main-
tenance of transnational ties. In fundamental ways, these
multi-faceted remittances can be read as practical invest-
ments. With concentration in low-wage, low-security em-
ployment sectors and high dependence on public
assistance, the Cambodian American community remains
plagued by economic vulnerability. In light of this contin-
ued marginalization, remittances can be viewed as strategic
efforts to enhance economic security with accumulation of
assets in Cambodia. Given the relative affordability of land
and the porous tax collection system in Cambodia, the
purchase of property in Cambodia is an investment that
yields not only economic returns but also psychical benefits
by making it possible for first-generation refugee, most of
whom are of agrarian background, to dream of spending
their golden years back in the ancestral country where they
can enjoy a higher quality of life.27 In the same vein, pro-
viding monetary gifts and loans to families and investment
in family enterprises is a way of buying into a future back
in Cambodia. These strategies mirror those adopted earlier
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by Portuguese-American elderly in the years prior to the
institution of social welfare programs in the US.
Gender, Generation, and Transnationalism
In addition to class, the ability of diasporas to re-engage the
homeland and to undertake an actual return is also filtered
through gender and generational prisms. In a country with
an acute shortage of skilled human resources, returning
Cambodians with their inherent comparative advantages
can access opportunities not easily found in diaspora. Pos-
session of a degree from an American institution, regardless
of whether or not it is accredited, work experience in the
West, and command of the English language are valued
assets in Cambodia. With economic and political liberaliza-
tion and the country’s heavy dependence on foreign assis-
tance and process, employment opportunities have
proliferated, especially in the public and private sectors.
Armed with Western training and education, newly minted
college graduates with little or no experience can access
positions of responsibility with governmental and non-gov-
ernmental agencies at a level that elsewhere would not be
possible. Some have been able to assume leadership roles
that have been impossible to achieve in diaspora where
community politics remain dominated by the older genera-
tion.
In the immediate aftermath of the peace settlement,
optimism about diasporas’ contributions to Cambodia’s
post-war reconstruction led to the creation of various pro-
grams to facilitate the transfer of skills. Along with the
employment opportunity that accompanied the growing
presence of international NGOs in Cambodia, these chan-
nels also provide important entrée for those desiring return
and re-engagement outside the political arena. As a result,
many Cambodian American youths are able to return to
Cambodia through educational or international aid pro-
grams. Commonly referred to as the “Cambodian Peace
Corps,” the CANDO program, for instance, conceived and
administered by a national Cambodian-American organi-
zation with USAID funding, brought back a number of
young volunteers to work in Cambodia in the early 1990s.
Younger-generation Cambodian-Americans also actively
engaged in fundraising for various development projects in
Cambodia. In the late 1990s, a transnational campaign to
build a dormitory in Phnom-Penh for low-income students
from the rural areas received much endorsement from the
Cambodian-American community. Various student asso-
ciations in California have been involved in establishing
scholarship funds for needy students in Cambodia. Follow-
ing the assassination of Oum Radsady, a respected adviser
to Prince Ranaridh, overseas Cambodians created a schol-
arship program in his name. Other community and stu-
dent-led initiatives include the remittance of funds by Cam-
bodian students at Berkeley to an orphanage in northwest-
ern Cambodia in 1998 and collection drives for books and
equipment to be sent to educational institutions in Cam-
bodia, as well as donations to help the reintegration of
Cambodian-American deportees.
Cambodian-American women, still hindered by the em-
bedded patriarchy of diasporic politics, also find a ready
niche within the emerging leadership in Cambodia. Many
have  found  that their  experiences  and leadership skills,
largely acquired through participation in American social
services or in community-based organizations, are needed
in a post-war society where women accounted for over 50
per cent of the population and where gender issues remain
pre-eminent national concerns. Many returning Cambo-
dian-American women also feel that in a situation of per-
sistent political volatility, their presence can serve as a
stabilizing force. One social advocate who had returned to
Cambodia since the early 1990s observed: “Women have a
cooler nature so they are not quick to anger and don’t
aggravate a potentially explosive situation. They can also
say things that a man would take personally if they were to
come from another man.”28 Though the leadership skills
and the experiences remitted through returning Cambo-
dian women have been most impactful in non-governmen-
tal sectors, their presence has also been registered in
national politics. One of the political parties in the 1998
elections was led by a Cambodian-American woman from
northern California. In the last coalition government, two
of the top positions in the newly reconfigured Ministry of
Women’s and Veterans’  Affairs  were held by  returning
Cambodian women, both from California. Their affiliation
with opposing parties underscores the ideological plural-
ism of overseas Cambodians.
The Role of Receiving State
Evidence of sustained transnational ties and initial enthusi-
asm about the contributing roles of returning diasporas
notwithstanding, post-war reality fell short of the expecta-
tions. The ability of diasporic communities to fully partici-
pate in homeland developments was thwarted by constraints
that are internal to the community and external to them.
Political instability, prevailing distrust, and lack of genuine
interest in cultivating diasporas’ potential contributions or
in facilitating the transfer of skills and resources stand as
significant impediments to sustained transnational involve-
ment. In examining diasporas’ engagement with the home-
land, it is therefore important to take into account not only
their desire for reconnection but also the opportunities that
are presented to them to re-engage and their  ability to
capitalize upon them. Their agency notwithstanding, dias-
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poras are also fundamentally subjected to forces beyond
their control. In critical ways, both the sending and the
receiving regimes influence diasporan politics and shape the
nature, scope, and depth of transnational linkages. For one,
the state and condition of the host economy impacts upon
the ability of people to remit resources and to travel back
and forth. The welfare reforms of 1996 and the uncertainties
that they engendered particularly among Cambodian eld-
erly hampered transnational activities. With the majority of
Cambodians in the US still without American citizenship,
anxieties engendered by the 1996 immigration reforms also
deterred the transnational flow.
Especially with regard to political activities, the ability of
diasporic communities to effectively advocate for home-
land causes depends to a large extent upon the receptivity
and tolerance of the host polity, hence upon the alignment
of the political agendas of the diasporic community with
those of the host government. History has shown that
exiles’ political concerns can be advanced or deterred, de-
pending upon the degree to which the host regime identifies
with these causes, upon the nature and status of bilateral
relationships between the two governments, and upon the
position that the receiving regime adopts on critical issues
such as democracy and human rights. Where diasporan
politics contradict the national interests, their cause célèbre
is often paralyzed by the political disregard of their adoptive
governments as evidenced by the stillborn resistance poli-
tics of the Vietnamese-American community. In the con-
text of the Cold War, the ideological commonality and
overlapping policy agendas between Washington and the
Cambodian non-communist groups in the 1980s and 1990s
facilitated the lobbying and advocacy work of Cambodian
diasporas. Washington’s support of the non-communist
Cambodian factions during the conflict period, crucial to
the military and political campaigns of the government-in-
exile, contrasts markedly with the notable reserve a decade
later with which the US government, now wedded to the
“successful” implementation of the Cambodia Peace Plan,
responded to the attack and suppression of pro-democracy
forces in Cambodia.
The Role of Sending State
Sending, like receiving, states can do much to facilitate or
impede transnational relations. Essentially, whether or not
the social, economic, and political capital that émigrés may
possess is fungible across transnational domains depends
upon the receptiveness of the home regime. Through legis-
lation and policies, governments can choose to include or
deny possibilities and incentives for diasporic contributions,
and in so doing define the parameters, terms, and nature of
involvement. A regime’s openness to diasporas can be in-
ferred from its policy articulation that gives priority to po-
litical reconciliation and economic rationality over power
consolidation and continued state control. The extent to
which governments are willing and able to create mecha-
nisms to facilitate capital remittance is an important gauge
of their attitude about diasporic contributions. In the case
of India, for instance, large government subsidies of non-
resident Indian investment contributed to a significant re-
patriation of capital from overseas Indian communities. In
contrast, the Cambodian government has been unsystem-
atic in its solicitation of diasporic involvement. Its ability to
strategically capitalize upon transnational remittance of
capital and expertise has largely been undermined by pre-
vailing distrust, weak and corrupt institutional and legal
infrastructure, a governance system paralyzed by partisan-
ship, and a state vision equally undercut by the same political
impediments.
Conversely, wariness on the part of home regimes, on the
other hand, can be deduced from legislative measures that
seek to restrict, limit, and render ambiguous the role of
overseas ethnic communities. Laws such as those regarding
property ownership, citizenship, and associated rights de-
fine the possibilities for diasporas’ political and economic
participation. The contestation of dual citizenship, for in-
stance, signals the Phnom-Penh regime’s persisting regard
of returning Cambodians as the “perpetual outsiders.” In
the same vein, lack of systemic transparency, poor legal
infrastructure, persisting political volatility, and intrusion
of politics in critical aspects of the society and economy
deter genuine commitment to long-term investment; many
of the economic initiatives remain “get-rich quick”
schemes. That many returning Cambodian-Americans had
to relive a replay of traumatic flight during the coup in July
1997 did little to restore diasporas’ confidence.
While it can be argued that the dominating Cambodian
People’s Party may harbour distrust of diasporic commu-
nities and of transnational connections, it is also true that
the Party, and particularly factions and individuals within
it, profits from these connections. Distrust notwithstand-
ing, elements in the Phnom-Penh regime do recognize the
potential of overseas Cambodians to provide valuable links
to public and private sectors outside of Cambodia, to tap
into international and transnational resources and support
given the connections and networks that they possess, and
to be important advocates especially in their adopted coun-
tries. In the early years of political liberalization when the
heretofore cloistered socialist government was feeling its
way towards closer relations with the West, regime support-
ers within the Cambodian-American community were par-
ticularly instrumental in helping government officials
navigate the labyrinth of the American political system.
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Over the years, Cambodian-Americans had helped garner
political support from various US administrations on criti-
cal initiatives such as the extension of the Most Favoured
Nation status to Cambodia. In the aftermath of the bloody
coup in 1997, a team of politically savvy Cambodian-
Americans was redeployed back to the US to exercise dam-
age control and to conduct aggressive public relations
campaigns on behalf of the Cambodian government. A
White Paper generated by the Cambodian People’s Party
(CPP) justifying the coup found its way into the Cambo-
dian-American community through regime supporters,
some of whom, ironically, were seeking temporary refuge
back in the US in the face of renewed civil war. Ensconced
in the safety of their American suburban homes, they elo-
quently argued for the necessity of state repression.
The Cambodian experience points to the importance of
looking both at the state and at the diasporic community not
as monolithic constructs but as comprising competing and
conflicting interests. Additionally, in looking at regime re-
sponses, distinctions must also be made between initiatives
that are pre-emptively undertaken by the state and those that
are reactive to developments and dynamics beyond their
control. While the communist faction in Phnom-Penh may
try to curtail the role of overseas Cambodians, the reality
remains that participation of Cambodian diasporas was an
integral part of the negotiated settlement. In effect, while the
communist-controlled government may be able to deter,
shape, and influence the nature, level, and scope of transna-
tional linkages, they cannot sever them without tremendous
economic and political costs. This litmus test came in the
wake of the 1997 coup that drove most of returning Cambo-
dians back into exile, and threatened to unravel both the
structure and the spirit of the power-sharing agreements.
Signals conveyed to the Hun Sen regime in the form of frozen
international assistance and diplomatic protestation com-
pelled the communist faction to move away from its hard-
line position and to include the non-communist groups in
the 1998 elections. Despite having consolidated their political
and military power, the CPP was unable to divest itself of the
power-sharing structure.
The Role of International, Transnational, and
Supranational Forces
Just as the state emerges as an important variable in the
analysis of transnationalism, so are international forces criti-
cal to the Cambodian transnational experience. Where the
state is autocratic and civil society incipient, dissenting
voices will have to find resonance through transnational
connections. The strengthening of vertical and horizontal
networks means that public accountability is no longer con-
fined to the conventional boundaries of national communi-
ties. Towards these ends, faxes and the Internet make com-
munication relatively easy and almost instantaneous, and
also infuse a poignant sense of immediacy to events that
would otherwise be lost amidst the media deluge of interna-
tional crises.
In the case of Cambodia, international monitoring, ex-
ercised through both governmental and non-governmental
mechanisms, has been instrumental in safeguarding the
role of diasporas in the nation’s post-war political proc-
esses. Since the brokering of the peace settlement, interna-
tional signatories have provided important intervention
during critical periods of turmoil. Following the commu-
nist-led coup of 1997, international pressure exerted upon
the Hun Sen regime made it possible for the non-commu-
nist political leadership to continue participation in the
country’s political processes. Though international stance
has been compromised in various instances by realpolitik,
the works of international NGOs, continuously advocating
for systemic reform and accountability in critical areas such
as environmental protection and human rights, help rein-
force the protestations from Cambodian diasporas. While
donor countries, heretofore, have been reluctant to attach
conditionality to their assistance programs, the decision
reached at the December 2004 donor meeting to insist upon
measurable reform progress is a significant step towards
greater accountability. Given the prevailing political cli-
mate in Cambodia, it would be difficult to assume that these
pressures would be exerted simply by forces within the
country or even by Cambodians alone.
The Problematics of Return
The intellectual optimism that is foregrounded in the dis-
cussion of transnationalism frequently deflects analytic at-
tention from the more destabilizing impact of these
transnational dynamics on social and cultural institutions
and on interpersonal relations that are also present. In many
respect, Cambodian transnational developments are rela-
tively recent phenomena. Though linkages have been devel-
oped and maintained over the last two decades of diaspora,
the deepening and diversification of the transnational con-
nections have registered, in slow increments, only since 1989
and, dramatically, only since the elections of 1993.
Despite the recency of these developments, some discon-
certing reverberations are already beginning to be felt. The
inflated expectation of expertise and resource remittance
from overseas communities did not account for the chal-
lenges of return and reintegration.
For the most part, national reconciliation in Cambodia has
been symbolic, with structural integration largely masking
the power asymmetry that still prevails within the coalition
government. Despite the rhetoric, distrust of diasporas pre-
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vails. For younger-generation Cambodians, in search of a
sense of  belonging denied them by  the racial politics of
America, Cambodia represents communal acceptance and
security that, in many instances, never materialize. For some,
reconnection with the ancestral country allows for a move-
ment away from internal confusion towards multi-faceted
loyalties and a hyphenated sense of identity. For many, the
anticipation of a seamless reconnection was marred by the
cultural and ideological distancing that they encounter,
poignantly conveyed through the ascription of the term ani-
kachun – literally translated as “ethnic minority” – for over-
seas Cambodians. The sense of alienation that one volunteer
experienced during her stay in Cambodia, feeling “that I am
just observing but not participating,”29 is also shared by a
fellow returnee who commented that “it was like I was in my
country but not my home.”30 Disillusioned by present-day
ills of Cambodian society, a young Cambodian-American
professional reflected: “Cambodia is behind me now. I have
to concentrate on building a life here in America.”31 At least
for this young Cambodian-American, return has lent itself to
the final rupture.
The implications of return for both the community in
diaspora and that in the originary context are also felt in
other ways. Repatriation of talent divests the diasporan
community of much-needed human capital. Given that
leadership is largely drawn from the pool of community-
based organizations, there is institutional destabilization
that results from the shortage of people to run programs
and to provide community leadership, at a time when
vulnerable communities are particularly impacted by
changing socio-political and economic trends in the US. In
various locales, such as Oakland and San Francisco with a
combined population of about twelve thousand Cambodi-
ans, the departure of agency directors and community
advocates in search of greater prospects in Cambodia left
Cambodian refugee communities without the institutional
support that had heretofore been provided by community-
based organizations. Whereas at the height of the refugee
resettlement era, the Cambodian community in the US
could count on the resources of some two hundred mutual
assistance agencies, at present there are only around twenty
viable organizations nationwide. As that generation of so-
cial service providers approaches retirement age and as the
future of social service programs becomes even more pre-
carious under the present political trends in America, it can
be assumed that the repatriation of diasporic talent and
leadership to Cambodia will increase. While this develop-
ment may  yield  opportunities for  a  younger  and  more
invigorated leadership to emerge, leadership transition has
not always been smooth and effectual. American education
and success in mainstream professional arenas do not nec-
essarily translate into effective functioning in a community
still comprised of first-generation refugees with limited
ability to speak English. The younger generation of leader-
ship that is now at the helm of many organizations fre-
quently finds itself unable to negotiate the complex, multi-
generational issues that beset the community. Until new
leadership can be cultivated and legitimated in multiple
political, cultural, and generational contexts, community
advancement will continue to be undermined by organiza-
tional instability and the absence of effective leadership.
In addition to the adverse implications for community
institutions, transnational developments also have a pro-
found impact on family institution and relations. Though
the full extent of the challenges remains to be systematically
uncovered, evidences of change in kinship dynamics are
already registering in various dimensions. Transnational
familial relations have been destabilized by the added eco-
nomic hardship, irreconcilable expectations, and asymmet-
rical power relations that remittance entails. Given the
cultural emphasis on gift giving, return visits can be costly
for diasporas already living on economic margins. For
many, there is the added pressure to “live up” to the image
of the successful migrant to which all-too-many respond by
going into severe debt. Within the diasporic community,
efforts to sustain transnational relations have paradoxically
eroded the foundation of the nuclear family in America. For
many  refugee  households, the  demand  of transnational
obligations exerts tremendous pressure on marriages and
on the household. This situation is further complicated
when it involves distant but sole surviving relatives. Given
that most of the returnees are male, an increasing number
of Cambodian-American women are finding themselves
becoming de facto heads of household, having to provide
financial support not only for the family in the US but also
for their self-repatriated spouses.
Moreover, the concept of “extended” families, in many
instances, has acquired a transnational dimension, includ-
ing in some cases multiple and simultaneous, formal and
informal “marriages.” The opportunity for finding a new
and, in most cases, much younger and “more traditional”
(often defined as more submissive) wife in Cambodia is
capitalized on by returning Cambodian men with ever
greater frequency. This recourse has presented itself as a
way of countering the enhanced independence that Cam-
bodian-American women are achieving through education
and workforce participation, particularly outside the home,
hence of reinforcing patriarchal dominance within the
Cambodian-American community. Interestingly, this
practice is not confined to the older generation but has also
become increasingly appealing to the younger generation.
The attractiveness of transnational marriage is also seen in
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the resurgence of the end-of the-century equivalent of the
“picture bride,” facilitated in this contemporaneous con-
text through the Internet. Whereas one can argue that
traditional marriages have always involved brokered ar-
rangements of convenience and expediency, it is important
to note that distance and migration divest this process of
the mediating and protective social and normative mecha-
nisms that governed the traditional system. The lure of a
promised escape from poverty often obscures a harsher
reality that awaits many of these young brides as they may
find themselves entering into a polygamous situation, or
left without the emotional and economic security that they
seek. For their part, the men may find that these “visa
marriages” do not yield the desired harmony, docility, and
stability, as some of  the women are quick to  seek new
options after having secured entry into the US.
Relational tension is also evident across the geographical
divide. Though they may benefit from the economic support
extended to them, relatives in Cambodia may also feel tre-
mendous resentment towards what they perceive as conde-
scension of their overseas benefactors. On their part,
Cambodian-Americans are frequently offended by what they
view as materialism and presumption of their kin at home.
The resentment at being regarded merely as a financier is
often compounded by the frustration about the seemingly
limitless expectations of their kin-recipients: “We work hard
in America; I don’t have money for them to squander.”32
Younger Cambodian-Americans, perhaps less burdened by
guilt than their elders, are most vociferous about what they
regard as abuses of generosity: “The relatives in Cambodia are
abusing the money we send them. They do not use the money
as we intended. They use the money for eating out . . . for
Seiko watches, expensive jeans.”33 Adoption of the capitalistic
emphasis on time and money has also contributed to chang-
ing norms governing relational obligation. Whereas relatives
in Cambodia may continue to view these remittances as
“gifts,” extended without expectations or conditions, diaspo-
ras often regard these ties on different terms. One Cambo-
dian-American woman pointed out that attaching
conditionality to these remittances “like a contract, a business
arrangement” is a way of helping the Cambodian people by
educating them to new and “more efficient” ways of manag-
ing their affairs.34 Given the power asymmetry inherent in the
relationship, these differing perceptions are often reduced to
the convenient binary of debt and gratitude, control and
subordination, and left unarticulated until family tension
erupts.
The shifts in social relations are also evident at the com-
munal level. Whereas traditionally, village projects, such as
well digging, are embarked upon through collective plan-
ning and decision making, the prevalence of transnationally
sponsored development has also been associated with the
erosion of local participation, hence of local ownership of
the process and the outcome. All too frequently, overseas
sponsors not only remit the capital but also unilaterally
determine the design and select the site for the construc-
tion. Distance is, therefore, measured not only in physical
space but also in relational terms, in the impersonalism
that, paradoxically, governs the very endeavours aimed at
strengthening communal bonds.
With growing exchange and, paradoxically, the sobering
of the initial euphoria, the challenges revealed by the ex-
panding and deepening of transnational relations are not
easily dismissed. Increase in travel to and from Southeast
Asia and in the number and complexity of transnational
family arrangements has intensified the growingly vocal-
ized concern over the transmission of AIDS and the dispar-
aging effects on the Cambodian family and society.
Because these concerns are mostly expressed by women
in a context that remains entrenchedly patriarchal, they
have yet to attain the necessary political decibel level. None-
theless, they are symptomatic of the growing discomfort
over the more destabilizing aspects of transnational dy-
namics. Though the ramifications of these transnational
dynamics remain to be fully unveiled, these concerns none-
theless speak to the need to give theoretical emphasis not
only to those who left, but also those who are left behind, on
both sides of the geographical divide, in this transnational
movement.
For the 1.8 generation35 and the American-born, who are
temporally disconnected from the immediacy of their par-
ents’ experiences, the “memory” of, and connection with,
the homeland are, for the most part, nurtured and trans-
mitted generationally within the family context. The reflec-
tion of this young volunteer who had returned as part of
the Cambodian-American National Development Organi-
zation (CANDO), often referred to as the Cambodian Peace
Corps, speaks to the fluidity between the “actual” and the
“imagined”:
. . . I have a lot of dreams, like the dream I had of working at
Angkor Wat when I was in the United States. I even told my
friends then of the magnificence of Angkor monuments with-
out having been there. Except for what I had seen in picture
books and from what my mom had told me, Angkor was just a
childhood memory. But now, I live and work there.36
For many of the younger generation, it is the search for
identity, through the reclaiming of a denied past, that com-
pels the return. It is a way of connecting with their families,
by sharing in the trauma that casts a pall even over those who
did not live through those defining historical events.
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